Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Apr 22, 2019 → Apr 24, 2019. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_97a0f83b28434de5 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
MA MT OR
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 1, 2017
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 24, 2018
Reported by HHS OCR, OREGON AG filings
Doctors' Management Service reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2019-04-22. The breach occurred from 4/1/2017 to 12/24/2018. 1 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 1
Doctors Management Services, Inc. reported to HHS on 2019-04-22 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 206,695 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The incident involved GandCrab ransomware encrypting files and exfiltrating data. Initial access occurred 2017-04-01; detected 2018-12-24. $100,000 settlement reached with OCR.
Affected (this filing): 206,695
Doctors' Management Service, Inc. ("DMS") reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2019-04-24. The breach occurred during 4/1/2017 - 12/24/2018. The breach was discovered on 12/24/2018. 206,695 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 4/22/2019.
Affected (this filing): 206,695
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.