Clustered 2 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filing window Mar 13, 2024 → Mar 14, 2024. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_182c8d3475684f1f · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Feb 26, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
California Correctional Health Care Services reported a data breach to the California Attorney General. The incident occurred on February 26, 2024. The filing indicates that patient information was affected, implying exposure of Protected Health Information (PHI) and basic identity data. No specific attack vector, number of affected individuals, or discovery date was provided in the public summary or the redacted attachment.
California Correctional Health Care Services reported to HHS on 2024-03-14 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 1,348 individuals. A workforce member inadvertently sent an email containing PHI — including names, diagnoses, lab results, and other treatment information — to an unintended recipient. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media, and responded by implementing additional administrative, technical, and security safeguards and retraining the responsible workforce member. Breached information was located in Email.
Affected (this filing): 1,348
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.