Clustered 3 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Nov 14, 2022. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_0144a45ddc98435e · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
MT WA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 4, 2022
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Oct 4, 2022
Reported by WASHINGTON AG filing
Yakima Neighborhood Health Services, a health sector entity reported a theft or mistake incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2022-10-04 and filed notice on 2022-11-14. 2,664 Washington residents were affected. 41 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 0 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 2,664
Yakima Neighborhood Health Services (WA) reported to HHS on 2022-11-14 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 2,689 individuals. A workforce member inadvertently sent PHI — including names, dates of birth, other identifiers, and treatment-related information — to the wrong email recipient. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media, posted a substitute notice, and responded with additional training, technical safeguards, and revised policies.
Affected (this filing): 2,689
Yakima Neighborhood Health Services reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2022-11-14. The breach occurred on 10/4/2022. 2 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 2
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.