Designs for Vision, Inc.
bd_80e4afb64c29abea · schema v1 · pii pii-v1
Full breach record for Designs for Vision, Inc. →Threat-actor claim — not a regulatory filing
This row is a claim by the ransomware group Akira on its public extortion blog. It has not been validated by the victim or any regulator. Treat attribution and counts as the threat actor's assertion until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure corroborates them.
Source: Ransomware.live
Post text · scraped from the leak site
Designs for Vision, Inc. specializes in high-quality magnificatio n and LED headlights for dental, medical, and low vision applicat ions. We will upload about 50gb of corporate documents soon. Lots of pr oject information, a bit of personal information, credit cards de tails and other financial and accounting information, contracts a nd agreements, NDA, etc.
J jump to incidentP pin to compareR raw source
Incident timeline — mostly unverified
? — ?
Breach window unknown
Oct 11, 2025
Claim posted
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Corroborated · see linked filings
Compliance clocks stay unassessable until a regulatory filing lands. Dashed segments fill in automatically when corroboration arrives.
Claim → filing
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Compliance clock
Not assessable
Linked disclosures
Why this link?Ransomware claims (1)
- Leak Siteakirabd_8a2ac319bd9de1f62025-10-13 · +2dVerified by operator
Regulatory filings (6) · sorted by filing gap
- New Hampshire State AGbd_37dfd97cafe9621e2026-01-05 · +86dVerified
- Maine State AGbd_81cad70ff6d8cb3c2026-01-05 · +86dCandidate
- Massachusetts State AGbd_94108c67d2bea6952026-01-05 · +86dVerified by operator
- Indiana State AGbd_a28962eddd6e0f522026-01-05 · +86dVerified by operator
Show 2 more filings ↓Show fewer ↑up to 86d gap
- Nebraska State AGbd_a558c87b4a2e4a5f2026-01-05 · +86dVerified by operator
- Vermont State AGbd_e7105a4c448b0e092026-01-05 · +86dVerified by operator
Filing propagation · 7 filings · 6 states
View merged incident ↗Pattern: first filing Oct 11, last Jan 5 (VT) — a 86-day rolling notification. Rolling spreads often mean counsel is filing as thresholds trip per state. Why this link?
Evidence ladder
Attacker assertion only. Establishes: claim date, group, alleged victim.
Unlocks: incident narrative, operational impact. Still no compliance clock.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
Unlocks: materiality, stated response, full audit trail. Ceiling removed.
Source ceiling
- actor name
- victim claim
- ransom/leak status
- discovery date
- materiality
- notification
- affected count
- confirmed data types
- compliance clock
The ✕ fields stay blank until a regulatory filing or victim disclosure lands.
akira
According to ransomware.live, The Akira ransomware group is said to have emerged in March 2023, and there's much speculation about its ties to the former CONTI ransomware group. It's worth noting that with the end of CONTI's operation, several affiliates migrated to independent campaigns such as Royal, BlackBasta, and others. According to some reports, Akira affiliates also work with other ransomware operations, such as Snatch and BlackByte, as an open directory of tools used by an Akira operator was identified, which also had connections to the Snatch ransomware. The first version of the Akira ransomware was written in C++ and appended files with the '.akira' extension, creating a ransom note named 'akira_readme.txt,' partially based on the Conti V2 source code. However, on June 29, 2023, a decryptor for this version was reportedly released by Avast. Subsequently, a version was released that fixed the decryption flaw on July 2, 2023. Since then, the new version is said to be written in Rust, this time called 'megazord.exe,' and it changes the extension to '.powerranges' for encrypted files. Most of Akira's initial access vectors use brute-force attempts on Cisco VPN devices (which use single-factor authentication only). Additionally, exploitation of CVEs: CVE-2019-6693 and CVE-2022-40684 for initial access has been identified. Source: https://github.com/crocodyli/ThreatActors-TTPs