Confirmed breach. Intrusion Feb 17, 2016, discovered Feb 17, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 29 days later. 53 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✓ CA 60-day OK · 21dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
53
Data types
3
Government ID · Identity (basic) · Financial
Jurisdictions
2
CA NH
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Feb 17, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Feb 17, 2016
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
⛰️New Hampshire State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
LAZ Karp Associates, LLC, a professional services firm, notified the New Hampshire Department of Justice on March 17, 2016, of a security incident involving personal information of approximately 53 current and former New Hampshire employees. The specific nature of the unauthorized access was not detailed in the filing.
Laz Karp Associates, LLC (doing business as LAZ Parking) experienced a business email compromise incident on February 17, 2016. An unknown individual impersonated an executive via email, tricking an employee into sending 2015 Form W-2s for employees. Affected data included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and compensation data. The company notified affected employees on March 9, 2016, and offered 24 months of identity protection services.
CA 60-day OK · 21d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.