Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Apr 16, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_faa7c9c733aa4fc1 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
CA WA
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Aug 30, 2024 → Dec 8, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Feb 11, 2026
Reported by WASHINGTON AG, CALIFORNIA AG filings
Providence, a health sector entity reported a unauthorized access incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2026-02-11 and filed notice on 2026-04-16. 838 Washington residents were affected. 64 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 530 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 838
Providence notified patients of a data breach involving Health Gorilla, a health information network connected to Providence's Epic EHR system. Between August 30, 2024, and December 8, 2025, patient health information may have been accessed or shared by HIE participants without a defined business need. Providence was notified of the issue on February 11, 2026. Affected data includes names, dates of birth, addresses, insurance policy numbers, test results, medications, and diagnoses. Social Security numbers were not involved. Providence is reviewing data-sharing practices and offering one year of identity protection services.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.