DisclosureLens
State AGConfirmed1 filing · 1 stateLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Incident · single filing

INGERSOLL RAND INC. — September 2006 breach

One linked filing — more sources may join as they report · filed Nov 10, 2006. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →

Determination

Confirmed

Members

1 filing

States

1

Affected · reported

18

First → last filing

Nov 10, 2006

incident inc_f67152e8b7af4894 · merged by deterministic

Confirmed breach. Intrusion Sep 29, 2006. 18 individuals reported across the linked filings.

Litigation Timing

Not recorded for this incident

Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing spanno leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.

Incident timeline

Sep 29, 2006breach begins
Nov 10, 2006first & only filing
watching for filings

No discovery date is recorded on any filing in this cluster, so the notification delay is not computable. Dashed segments fill in as filings merge.

Member cascade — every filing about this breach

  1. NOV 10NH AGNH AG noticeonly filing · 18 NH residentsday 0
  2. Watching for additional filings — new sources merge into this incident automatically.

Roll-up facts — reconciled across members

Breach window
Sep 29, 2006
NH AG
Discovered
Data types
Identity (basic) · Government ID
NH AG
Attack vector
Unauthorized Access
NH AG
Response
Mailing a notification letter to the affected New Hampshire residents
NH AG

Each fact cites the member filing that establishes it; when filings conflict, every value shows with its source.

Evidence ladder — rungs this incident occupies

Leak-site claim

No leak-site claim on record for this incident.

Press / market report

No press coverage linked yet.

State AG / regulator filing1 member

Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.

SEC 8-K / victim statement

No SEC filing or victim statement yet.

About this clustering

DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.