Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 2, 2026–Mar 11, 2026, discovered Mar 30, 2026 — the first regulatory filing landed 15 days later. 65,000 individuals reported across the linked filings.
incident inc_f51e342e1e9a449f · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Litigation Timing
Notification delay
15days
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Discovery variance
0days
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Filing span
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✓ CA 30-day OK · 14dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
0days
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
65,000
Data types
2
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Mar 2, 2026 → Mar 11, 2026
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Mar 30, 2026
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG, HHS OCR filings
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via tight-window match · 100%
City Health, a medical corporation, reported unauthorized access to patient health information occurring between March 2 and March 11, 2026, discovered on March 30, 2026. Affected data included names, insurance company names, and procedure codes. SSNs, DOBs, and contact info were not involved. The company secured systems, engaged experts, and is reviewing policies.
City Health, a medical corporation (CA) reported to HHS OCR on 2026-04-14 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure breach affecting 65,000 individuals. Breached information was located in Electronic Medical Record systems. No business associate was identified as present. No further details were available in the web description.
Affected (this filing): 65,000
HHS notified
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.