Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
5,500
Data types
3
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
IN
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jun 5, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
65 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Julie D Kinsler DDS LLC dba Kinsler Family Dentistry reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-06-05 and was reported on 2024-08-09. 2,209 Indiana residents were affected. 2,216 individuals affected in total.
Kinsler Family Dentistry (Julie D. Kinsler DDS LLC), an Indiana dental healthcare provider, reported to HHS on 2024-08-12 a ransomware attack affecting 5,500 individuals. Breached information was located on a network server. PHI involved included names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, lab results, medications, diagnoses, and other treatment information. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, the media, and posted substitute notice on its website, and implemented additional administrative, technical, and security safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 5,500
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.