Clustered 3 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filing window Jun 20, 2014 → Jun 25, 2014. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_f1a70f0f36b24961 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 30, 2009 → Nov 30, 2011
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jun 6, 2014
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego reported a breach involving unauthorized access to patient records. The incident involved the compromise of valid credentials, affecting data spanning from 2009 to 2011. Records accessed included names, addresses, and government-issued ID numbers. The breach was reported to the California Attorney General in June 2014.
Rady Children's Hospital - San Diego reported to HHS on 2014-06-24 a Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 14121 individuals. Breached information located on Email.
Affected (this filing): 14,121
Rady Children's Hospital - San Diego reported to HHS OCR on 2014-06-25 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure breach affecting 6,307 individuals. Breached information was located on Email and Other media. No business associate was identified as involved. The web description was not provided; further details of the unauthorized access or disclosure are not publicly available from this filing.
Affected (this filing): 6,307
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.