Confirmed breach. Intrusion May 31, 2017–Jun 2, 2017, discovered Jun 2, 2017 — the first regulatory filing landed 62 days later. 3,400 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✓ CA 60-day OK · 49dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
3,400
Data types
3
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
May 31, 2017 → Jun 2, 2017
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Jun 2, 2017
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
62 days
🐻California State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
City of Hope notified California regulators and patients of a phishing incident in May 2017. The attack compromised four staff email accounts containing patient PHI (names, MRNs, DOB, clinical info). No SSN or financial data was involved. City of Hope secured accounts, engaged forensic investigators, and reported to law enforcement.
CA 60-day OK · 49d
🐻CALIFORNIAHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
City of Hope reported to HHS on 2017-08-03 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 3400 individuals. Breached information located on Email. A workforce member was victim of an email phishing scheme. PHI involved included names, addresses, DOB, SSN, diagnosis, lab results, medications, and treatment info. Remote VPN access was disabled.
Affected (this filing): 3,400
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.