BST & Co. CPAs, LLP reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-02-14. The breach occurred from 12/4/2019 to 12/7/2019. 5 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 5
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Feb 14, 2020 → Feb 16, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_e99e64303e184fca · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Health (basic) · Financial account
MT NY
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Dec 4, 2019
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 7, 2019
Reported by HHS OCR filing
BST & Co. CPAs, LLP reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-02-14. The breach occurred from 12/4/2019 to 12/7/2019. 5 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 5
BST & Co. CPAs, LLP, a New York public accounting and management consulting firm acting as a HIPAA business associate, reported to HHS OCR on 2020-02-16 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 170,000 individuals. On December 7, 2019, BST discovered part of its network was infected with ransomware, impacting PHI of its covered entity client stored on a Network Server. OCR found BST failed to conduct an adequate risk analysis. BST settled for $175,000 and entered a two-year corrective action plan.
Affected (this filing): 170,000
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.