Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jul 1, 2024–Jul 10, 2024, discovered Aug 16, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 31 days later. 537 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaine⏱ ME AG >30d · 31dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
537
Data types
2
PII · Government ID
Jurisdictions
2
IN ME
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jul 1, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
46 days
Breach discovered
Aug 16, 2024
Reported by MAINE AG filing
31 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Netherland Sewell & Associates reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-07-01 and was reported on 2024-09-16. 3 Indiana residents were affected. 537 individuals affected in total.
On July 10, 2024, Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc. (NSAI), a Dallas-based commercial firm, experienced a ransomware attack that disrupted its company network. The breach was discovered on or around August 16, 2024. Social Security numbers may have been compromised. A total of 537 individuals were affected, including 1 Maine resident. Consumer notification letters were sent September 16, 2024. Experian IdentityWorks credit monitoring was offered for 24 months.
Affected (this filing): 1
ME AG >30d · 31d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.