Rail Europe SAS — June 2017 breach
One linked filing — more sources may join as they report · filed May 30, 2018. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_de40f9292c594606 · merged by deterministic
Litigation Timing
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing span — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Incident timeline
Dashed segments are unestablished, not zero — they fill in as filings merge into this incident.
Member cascade — every filing about this breach
- MAY 30NH AGNH AG noticeonly filing · 22 NH residentsday 0
- Watching for additional filings — new sources merge into this incident automatically.
Roll-up facts — reconciled across members
- Breach window
- Jun 15, 2017 – Feb 16, 2018 NH AG
- Discovered
- Feb 16, 2018· 246d undetected NH AG
- Data types
- Identity (basic) · Financial account · Credentials NH AG
- Attack vector
- Unauthorized Access NH AG
- Response
- Rail Europe engaged two forensic analysis and security auditing firms · Rail Europe shut down the affected ecommerce websites · All compromised servers were cut off from the Internet and completely isolated NH AG
Each fact cites the member filing that establishes it; when filings conflict, every value shows with its source.
Evidence ladder — rungs this incident occupies
No leak-site claim on record for this incident.
No press coverage linked yet.
Unlocks: discovery date, data types, affected count, compliance clock.
No SEC filing or victim statement yet.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.