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Structured extracts of public breach disclosures — regulator filings (SEC, HHS, state AGs, EU DPAs) alongside threat-actor leak-site claims and press reports. SEC and HHS filings render inline from the originating regulator’s public record under the fair report privilege; other sources link out to the source URL. AI-extracted with full per-record audit trail (model, prompt version, confidence).

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County of Los Angeles data breach (2010) · DisclosureLens

All incidents View linkage analytics →

Incident · single filing

County of Los Angeles

One linked filing — more sources may join as they report · filed Sep 17, 2010. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →

Confirmed breach. 33,000 individuals reported across the linked filings.

incident inc_dc215484119b40e9 · merge_method deterministic

Litigation Timing

Not recorded for this incident

Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing span — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.

Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline

HHS OCRConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity

Affected (total reported)

33,000

Data types

Health (basic)

Jurisdictions

FEDERAL

Linked filings

all HHS OCR

Timeline

Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline

FEDERALHHS OCRFirst filing
Filed Sep 17, 2010bd_e8a0919025b390de
County of Los Angeles reported to HHS on 2010-09-17 a Theft affecting 33000 individuals. Breached information located on Paper/Films.
Affected (this filing): 33,000
HHS notified

About this clustering

DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.