Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Jan 15, 2021. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_d88e5e50aad54003 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
MD ME MT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Aug 20, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Nov 16, 2020
Reported by MAINE AG filing
Montgomery Hospice, Inc. reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-01-15. The breach occurred from 8/20/2020 to 11/16/2020. 1 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 1
Montgomery Hospice, Inc. experienced an external system breach on August 20, 2020, which was discovered on November 16, 2020. The breach affected 1,440 individuals, compromising names and Social Security numbers. The company notified affected individuals on January 15, 2021, and offered 12 months of identity protection services.
Affected (this filing): 1,440
Montgomery Hospice, Inc. reported to HHS on 2021-01-15 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 6741 individuals. Breached information located on Email. Employees were victims of an email phishing attack exposing PHI including names, medical record numbers, DOB, SSN, and treatment info. Response included workforce retraining, credit monitoring, and technical safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 6,741
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.