Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
26,696
Data types
1
Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
SC
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jul 5, 2024 → Jul 11, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Jul 11, 2024
Reported by SOUTH CAROLINA AG filing
371 days
🌴SOUTH CAROLINAHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Self Regional Healthcare (Greenwood, SC) reported to HHS OCR on 2025-07-17 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 26,696 individuals. Breached information was located on a Network Server. A business associate was present. No further detail was provided in the HHS web description.
Affected (this filing): 26,696
HHS notified
🌴South Carolina State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Self Regional Healthcare (SRH) notified affected individuals that Nationwide Recovery Services (NRS), a former debt collection vendor, experienced unauthorized access to its network in July 2024. Files containing patient data from 2012-2013 were copied. Data exposed includes names, DOBs, SSNs, diagnoses, and medical info. NRS discovered the breach on July 11, 2024. SRH is offering 12 months of IDX identity protection.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.