Confirmed breach. Intrusion Apr 15, 2025, discovered Jun 16, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 17 days later. 1,505 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksTexas✓ TX AG ≤30dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,505
Data types
2
Government ID · PII
Jurisdictions
2
IN TX
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Apr 15, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
62 days
Breach discoveredAG web form
Jun 16, 2025
Reported by TEXAS AG filing
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Texas Biomedical Research Institute reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-04-15 and was reported on 2025-07-03. 1 Indiana residents were affected. 1,505 individuals affected in total.
Texas Biomedical Research Institute based in San Antonio, Texas, a nonprofit organization entity reported a data breach to the Texas Attorney General. The breach was discovered on 2025-06-16 and reported on 2025-07-08. 1,394 Texas residents were affected. 1,505 individuals affected in total. Types of information involved: Name of individual;Social Security Number Information. Consumers were notified via U.S. Mail.
Affected (this filing): 1,394
TX AG ≤30d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.