Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Oct 30, 2017 → Nov 3, 2017. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_d17f747029d841b4 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
CA WA
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Sep 27, 2017
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Sep 27, 2017
Reported by WASHINGTON AG, CALIFORNIA AG filings
HumanGood, a non-profit/charity sector entity reported a unauthorized access incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2017-09-27 and filed notice on 2017-10-30. 642 Washington residents were affected. 33 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 0 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 642
HumanGood notified the California Attorney General that a third-party benefits coordination vendor may have accessed personal information of 4,844 HumanGood employees residing in California. The incident occurred and was discovered on September 27, 2017. Affected data included names, addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, wage information, and medical information. HumanGood notified the FBI and local law enforcement and offered 12 months of credit monitoring and identity protection services through AllClear ID.
Affected (this filing): 4,844
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.