Kicky Pants, Inc. d/b/a KikKee Pants reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-01-21. The breach occurred from 9/24/2015 to 12/26/2015. 17 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 17
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Jan 21, 2016. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_c8051e6284504035 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
CA MT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Sep 24, 2015
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 31, 2015
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Kicky Pants, Inc. d/b/a KikKee Pants reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-01-21. The breach occurred from 9/24/2015 to 12/26/2015. 17 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 17
Kicky Pants, Inc. (d/b/a KicKee Pants) disclosed a data breach occurring between September 24, 2015, and December 26, 2015, discovered on December 31, 2015. An unknown third party acquired confidential customer information, including names, credit card details (number, expiration, CVV), billing addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses. The company closed the breach, changed transaction processing methods, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring and identity theft protection via ID Experts. No evidence of misuse was found at the time of disclosure.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.