Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 30, 2016, discovered Mar 30, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 135 days later (flagged late). 882,590 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Valley Anesthesiology Consultants, Inc., d/b/a Valley Anesthesiology and Pain Consultants reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-08-12. The breach occurred during 3/30/2016. The breach was discovered on 6/13/2016. 882,590 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 8/12/2016.
Affected (this filing): 882,590
OR AG >45d
🐻California State AGlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Valley Anesthesiology and Pain Consultants reported unauthorized access to computer systems on March 30, 2016, discovered June 13, 2016. Systems may contain patient names, SSNs, Medicare numbers, and diagnosis codes. Forensic investigation found no evidence of access but could not rule it out. No financial data was compromised. The company offered one-year credit monitoring and identity protection services to affected individuals.
🇺🇸AZHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Valley Anesthesiology Consultants, Inc. d/b/a Valley Anesthesiology and Pain Consultants (AZ) reported to HHS on 2016-08-12 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 882,590 individuals. On March 30, 2016, a third party may have gained unauthorized access via remote desktop protocol using accounts with administrator privileges across the CE's network servers. Nine foreign IPs were identified and blacklisted; 15 suspicious local and 3 admin accounts were found potentially compromised. Breached ePHI included demographic and clinical information. OCR provided technical assistance on risk analysis, training, and access controls.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.