Stamford Podiatry Group reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-05-24. The breach occurred from 2/22/2016 to 4/14/2016. 1 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 1
Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window May 24, 2016 → Jun 20, 2016. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_bdbe198a0d0f42f4 · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
CT MT OR
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Feb 22, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 14, 2016
Reported by HHS OCR, OREGON AG filings
Stamford Podiatry Group reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-05-24. The breach occurred from 2/22/2016 to 4/14/2016. 1 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 1
Stamford Podiatry Group .P.C. reported to HHS on 2016-05-25 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 40,491 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. Unauthorized individuals gained privileged access to the server between Feb 2 and April 14, 2016, exposing demographic, financial, and clinical data. The entity retrained staff, rebuilt its IT environment, and implemented new risk management policies.
Affected (this filing): 40,491
Stamford Podiatry Group, PC reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2016-06-20. The breach occurred during 2/12/2016 - 4/14/2016. The breach was discovered on 4/14/2016. Notice was sent on 5/25/2016.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.