Confirmed breach. Intrusion Mar 31, 2026, discovered Apr 11, 2026 — the first regulatory filing landed 41 days later. 25,535 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaine⏱ ME AG >30d · 44dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedlow sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
25,535
Data types
1
Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
IN ME
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Mar 31, 2026
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Apr 11, 2026
Reported by MAINE AG filing
41 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors' Association reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2026-03-31 and was reported on 2026-05-22. 12 Indiana residents were affected. 25,535 individuals affected in total.
Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors' Association (MMMCA) reported an external system breach (hacking) occurring on March 31, 2026, discovered on April 11, 2026. The incident affected 25,528 individuals, including 1 Maine resident. The breach involved the acquisition of names and other personal identifiers. MMMCA provided written notification to affected individuals on May 22, 2026, and offered 12 months of identity theft protection services through Experian IdentityWorks.
Affected (this filing): 25,528
ME AG >30d · 44d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.