Northeast Radiology reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-03-11. The breach occurred from 4/14/2019 to 1/7/2020. 14 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 14
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Mar 11, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_bb1639ad2fab40c1 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
FEDERAL MT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 14, 2019
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Northeast Radiology reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-03-11. The breach occurred from 4/14/2019 to 1/7/2020. 14 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 14
Northeast Radiology, P.C. (NERAD) reported to HHS OCR on 2020-03-11 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 298,532 individuals. Between April 2019 and January 2020, unauthorized individuals accessed radiology images stored on NERAD's PACS (Picture Archiving and Communication System) network server. OCR's investigation found NERAD failed to conduct a required risk analysis. NERAD paid a $350,000 settlement and entered a two-year corrective action plan as the 6th enforcement action under OCR's Risk Analysis Initiative.
Affected (this filing):
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.