Confirmed breach. Intrusion Apr 18, 2016–Apr 21, 2016, discovered Jun 14, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 59 days later. 651,971 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
651,971
Data types
3
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
CA MD
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Apr 18, 2016 → Apr 21, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
57 days
Breach discovered
Jun 14, 2016
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
59 days
🦀MARYLANDHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Bon Secours Health System Incorporated reported to HHS on 2016-08-12 a Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 651971 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. A business associate left ePHI (names, SSN, clinical info) unsecured via the Internet. The CE terminated the BA relationship and offered credit monitoring.
Affected (this filing): 651,971
🐻California State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Bon Secours Health System, Inc. reported a data breach involving vendor R-C Healthcare Management. Between April 18-21, 2016, a vendor misconfigured network settings, exposing patient files containing names, SSNs, insurance IDs, and limited clinical info. Discovered June 14, 2016, Bon Secours secured the data and offered credit monitoring. No medical records were exposed.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.