Desert AIDS Project reported to HHS OCR on 2012-04-20 a Theft incident affecting 4,400 individuals. Breached information was located on a Desktop Computer. No business associate was identified as involved.
Affected (this filing): 4,400
Clustered 2 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filed Apr 20, 2012. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_ac91641994424267 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 12, 2012
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 13, 2012
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Desert AIDS Project reported to HHS OCR on 2012-04-20 a Theft incident affecting 4,400 individuals. Breached information was located on a Desktop Computer. No business associate was identified as involved.
Affected (this filing): 4,400
Desert AIDS Project reported a physical theft of a receptionist's computer on April 12, 2012. The device contained a spreadsheet with client names, staff assignments, status, ID numbers, and dates of birth. No medical records, SSNs, or financial data were stored on the device. The theft was reported to the Palm Springs Police Department, and the organization enhanced site security.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.