Confirmed breach. Intrusion Sep 25, 2016–Oct 31, 2016, discovered Oct 31, 2016 — the first regulatory filing landed 67 days later (flagged late). 21 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 67dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
21
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
CA MT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Sep 25, 2016
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
LASOC - Legal Aid Society of Orange County reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2017-01-06. The breach occurred from 9/25/2016 to 10/31/2016. 21 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 21
🐻California State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Legal Aid Society of Orange County disclosed a data breach involving its I-CAN! web application, which was used for the IRS Free File Program. On October 31, 2016, the organization discovered that completed tax forms from 2007 and 2008, containing names and Social Security numbers, were temporarily accessible to the public via internet search engines. The organization engaged forensic investigators, disabled the application, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring. No actual misuse of data was confirmed.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.