Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 23, 2025, discovered Nov 23, 2025 — the first regulatory filing landed 190 days later (flagged late). 94,434 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMassachusetts✗ MA AG >90dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
94,434
Data types
3
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
IN MA
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 23, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Nov 23, 2025
Reported by MASSACHUSETTS AG filing
190 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Legal Services of Long Island reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-11-23 and was reported on 2026-06-01. 27 Indiana residents were affected. 94,434 individuals affected in total.
Legal Services of Long Island, Inc. notified Massachusetts AG on June 1, 2026, of a security incident discovered November 23, 2025. An unauthorized third party accessed systems and removed data, potentially exposing names, DOBs, SSNs, and health information. The company engaged forensic specialists, reset passwords, and severed access. Affected individuals are offered 12-24 months of credit monitoring and dark web scanning via IDX.
MA AG >90d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.