Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing span — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 449dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
—
Data types
4
Government ID · Identity (basic) · Employment
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
1
all State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Sep 1, 2013 → Mar 9, 2015
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
University of Connecticut notified California AG that malware compromised School of Engineering servers starting Sept 2013, detected March 2015. Files contained SSNs, names, contact info, employment, and student data. No confirmed access/disclosure, but notification sent to potentially affected individuals offering 12 months identity protection via AllClear ID.
CA 60-day late · 449d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.