Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Apr 8, 2021 → Apr 14, 2021. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_9f9ae84730424407 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
CA FEDERAL MT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 24, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 3, 2020
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Neighborhood Healthcare reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-04-08. The breach occurred from 11/24/2020 to 12/3/2020. 4 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 4
Neighborhood Healthcare notified patients and employees of a ransomware attack launched by a threat actor against Netgain, their third-party cloud hosting provider, on December 3, 2020, following initial unauthorized access on November 24, 2020. PHI (patient data) and employee PII including SSNs, dates of birth, addresses, and employment/retirement data may have been exposed. Netgain paid a ransom and obtained assurances the data would be deleted. Neighborhood Healthcare transitioned to a new hosting provider and offered IDX identity protection services.
Neighborhood Healthcare reported to HHS on 2021-04-14 that its business associate experienced a ransomware attack affecting 45,200 individuals. The breach occurred on a Network Server and involved electronic protected health information (ePHI), including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, diagnoses, treatment information, and claims information.
Affected (this filing): 45,200
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.