InFirst Bank (American Banking Systems) reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-12-04. The breach occurred from 10/22/2020 to 11/18/2020. 16 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 16
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Dec 4, 2020 → Dec 18, 2020. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_9edc98380cb948a7 · merge_method human · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
ME MT
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 22, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Nov 16, 2020
Reported by MAINE AG filing
InFirst Bank (American Banking Systems) reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2020-12-04. The breach occurred from 10/22/2020 to 11/18/2020. 16 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 16
On October 22, 2020, InFirst Bank experienced an external system breach (hacking), which was discovered on November 16, 2020. The breach compromised financial account or credit/debit card numbers along with their associated security codes, access codes, or PINs. The incident affected 36,404 individuals in total, including 10 residents of Maine. Affected individuals were notified on December 18, 2020, and offered 12 months of identity monitoring, fraud consultation, and identity theft restoration services through Transunion.
Affected (this filing): 10
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.