Confirmed breach. Intrusion Sep 25, 2013–Oct 9, 2013, discovered Oct 9, 2013 — the first regulatory filing landed 146 days later. 3,534 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
3,534
Data types
2
Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Sep 25, 2013 → Oct 9, 2013
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Eureka Internal Medicine (CA) reported to HHS OCR on 2014-03-04 an Improper Disposal breach affecting 3,534 individuals. Breached information was located on Paper/Films. No business associate was involved. No further detail is available from the HHS web description.
Affected (this filing): 3,534
HHS notified
🐻California State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Eureka Internal Medicine experienced a data breach between September 25 and October 9, 2013, when a janitorial service mixed patient paper recycling containing PII and PHI with regular trash instead of using a locked shredding bin. The breach involved names, SSNs, insurance info, and medical records. No specific count of affected individuals was disclosed, though the firm assessed the likelihood of unauthorized access as very low.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.