Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 15, 2018–Nov 19, 2018, discovered Nov 19, 2018 — the first regulatory filing landed 71 days later (flagged late). 35,253 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay · Filing span — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✗ HIPAA 60-day late · 71dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedmoderate sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
35,253
Data types
4
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
SC
Linked filings
1
all HHS OCR
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 15, 2018 → Nov 19, 2018
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Roper St. Francis Healthcare reported to HHS on 2019-01-29 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 35253 individuals. Breached information located on Email. Employees followed phishing links and provided credentials, allowing unauthorized access to PHI.
Affected (this filing): 35,253
HIPAA 60-day late · 71dHHS notified · 71d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.