Hunter Associates reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2026-04-22 and was reported on 2026-06-15. 7 Indiana residents were affected. 4,326 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 4,326
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Jun 15, 2026 → Jun 18, 2026. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_927f9c4b365f4d53 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
IN NH
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 22, 2026
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 29, 2026
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
Hunter Associates reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2026-04-22 and was reported on 2026-06-15. 7 Indiana residents were affected. 4,326 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 4,326
Hunter Associates, a financial services firm, notified the New Hampshire Attorney General of a data event involving its third-party vendor, FoxTrot, LLC. Unauthorized access occurred on April 22, 2026, potentially exposing names, Social Security numbers, and investment account numbers of 10 New Hampshire residents. Hunter discovered the incident on April 29, 2026, and notified individuals on June 15, 2026. Hunter terminated the vendor relationship and provided 24 months of credit monitoring.
Affected (this filing): 10
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.