Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 19, 2024, discovered Nov 21, 2024 — the first regulatory filing landed 195 days later (flagged late). 1,483 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksCalifornia✗ CA 60-day late · 188dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedlow sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,483
Data types
2
PII · Identity (basic)
Jurisdictions
2
CA IN
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 19, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discoveredletter-grounded
Nov 21, 2024
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
195 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Prenovost Normandin Dawe & Rocha APC reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-11-19 and was reported on 2025-06-04. 2 Indiana residents were affected. 1,483 individuals affected in total.
Prenovost, Normandin, Dawe & Rocha, A.P.C. notified the California AG of a data security incident. Suspicious activity was discovered on November 21, 2024, with the breach occurring on November 19, 2024. The firm engaged cybersecurity experts and determined that certain personal information was acquired without authorization. Affected individuals in California, Kentucky, Oregon, and North Carolina were offered identity monitoring services through Kroll. No evidence of misuse was found.
CA 60-day late · 188d
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.