Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksOregon✗ OR AG >45dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
750,500
Data types
3
Health (basic) · Identity (basic) · Government ID
Jurisdictions
2
FEDERAL OR
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jul 3, 2021 → Jul 15, 2021
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
156 days
🦫Oregon State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Oregon Anesthesiology Group, P.C. reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2021-12-06. The breach occurred during 7/3/2021 - 7/15/2021. The breach was discovered on 7/11/202110/21/2021. 750,500 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 12/3/202112/6/2021.
Affected (this filing): 750,500
OR AG >45d
🇺🇸FEDERALHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
The covered entity (CE), Oregon Anesthesiology Group, reported that it experienced a ransomware attack that affected the protected health information (PHI) of 750,500 individuals. The PHI involved included names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, diagnoses, and claims information. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media. In response to the breach the CE implemented additional administrative and technical safeguards to better protect PHI.
Affected (this filing): 750,500
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.