Clustered 3 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filing window Jun 6, 2025 → Jun 23, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_901fd43e3e8c4978 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
PHI · Health (basic) · Identity (basic)
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Apr 25, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Apr 25, 2025
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Blue Shield of California reported to HHS on 2025-06-06 a Unauthorized Access/Disclosure affecting 1543 individuals. Breached information located on Other. Business associate present: Yes.
Affected (this filing): 1,543
Blue Shield of California (Business Associate, CA) reported to HHS OCR on 2025-06-23 an Unauthorized Access/Disclosure breach affecting 673 individuals. The breached information was located in Email. A business associate was present. No further detail was available from the web description.
Affected (this filing): 673
Blue Shield of California disclosed an incident on April 25, 2025, where a customer service agent accidentally filtered a search and emailed protected health information (PHI) belonging to multiple members to an unauthorized recipient. The PHI included names, subscriber IDs, group numbers, account numbers, claim numbers, procedure codes, addresses, and doctor information. No SSNs or financial data were involved. The recipient reported the error immediately. Blue Shield disabled the encryption key, attempted to contact the recipient, educated the employee, and updated procedures. Affected individuals are offered one year of Experian IdentityWorks.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.