Toro Enterprises Inc reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-06-05 and was reported on 2024-10-23. 2 Indiana residents were affected. 1,472 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 1,472
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Oct 23, 2024. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_8f041b2f86894ca0 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID
CA IN
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jun 5, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Toro Enterprises Inc reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-06-05 and was reported on 2024-10-23. 2 Indiana residents were affected. 1,472 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 1,472
Toro Enterprises, Inc. notified the California Attorney General of a data breach occurring on June 5, 2024. The notice letter, signed by President Sean Castillo, offers 12 months of credit monitoring and fraud assistance via Cyberscout to affected individuals. The letter specifically addresses North Carolina residents, indicating they were among those affected. The specific nature of the breach (e.g., hacking, ransomware) and the exact data types compromised are not detailed in the provided notice text, though the offer of credit monitoring implies exposure of personally identifiable information.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.