Confirmed breach. Intrusion Feb 1, 2018–Mar 31, 2018, discovered Feb 1, 2018 — the first regulatory filing landed 76 days later (flagged late). 85,000 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✗ HIPAA 60-day late · 76dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
85,000
Data types
4
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
Jurisdictions
1
CA
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Feb 1, 2018 → Mar 31, 2018
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Breach discovered
Feb 1, 2018
Reported by HHS OCR filing
76 days
🐻CALIFORNIAHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Center for Orthopaedic Specialists - Providence Medical Institute (PMI) reported to HHS on 2018-04-18 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 85,000 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The breach involved ransomware attacks encrypting ePHI between February and March 2018. A $240,000 civil monetary penalty was imposed by OCR.
Center for Orthopaedic Specialists (COS) experienced a ransomware attack via a third-party IT vendor between Feb 18 and Mar 4, 2018. Malicious software encrypted patient data including names, DOBs, medical records, and SSNs. COS states no data was removed/exfiltrated. The affected system was taken offline. Federal law enforcement was notified. Patients are offered 24 months of identity theft protection.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.