Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jan 2, 2026, discovered Jan 3, 2026 — the first regulatory filing landed 125 days later. 2 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksLeak gap⏱ Leak >90dFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
State AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
2
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
2
NH VT
Linked filings
2
all State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jan 2, 2026
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Cape Fear Country Club reported a data breach to the Vermont Attorney General. The breach was reported to the AGO on 2026-05-08. The reporting organization type is Other Commercial. 1 Vermont residents were affected. Categories of data breached: Social Security Numbers, Financial Account Codes, Credit or Debit Account Info.
Leak >90d
⛰️New Hampshire State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Cape Fear Country Club notified the New Hampshire Attorney General on May 8, 2026, of a data security incident discovered on January 3, 2026. Unauthorized access occurred on or about January 2, 2026, potentially exposing names, Social Security numbers, and financial account information of 2 New Hampshire residents. The club engaged forensic experts, offered 12 months of credit monitoring, and implemented additional security measures.
Affected (this filing): 2
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.