Clustered 2 filings across 1 jurisdiction · filed Jun 24, 2014. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_8710cbaee6504104 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
Health (basic) · Identity (basic) · Government ID
CA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Jun 17, 2014 → Jun 18, 2014
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Jun 18, 2014
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG, HHS OCR filings
Riverside County Regional Medical Center reported the loss of a laptop containing patient names, dates of birth, medical record numbers, and nerve conduction study results. The device was missing between June 17 and 18, 2014. No SSNs or insurance info were present. The incident is under active investigation by hospital staff and law enforcement.
Riverside County Regional Medical Center (CA) reported to HHS on 2014-06-24 a Theft affecting 563 individuals. On or around June 18, 2014, a laptop used with an EMG machine was lost or stolen. The laptop contained ePHI including patient names, medical record numbers, dates of birth, ages, genders, heights/weights, clinical data, and study reports. OCR investigated this breach jointly with two additional lost/stolen laptop incidents within six months. The CE implemented corrective actions including encryption, physical security improvements, and process changes.
Affected (this filing):
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.