Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
182,947
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
3
MT OR WA
Linked filings
3
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Aug 16, 2019
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
119 days
🌲WASHINGTONHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Vimly Benefit Solutions, Inc. reported to HHS on 2019-12-13 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 182,947 individuals. Breached information located on Email. Employees were victims of an email phishing scheme affecting ePHI (names, DOB, addresses, SSNs, enrollment info). The BA provided credit monitoring and retrained staff.
Affected (this filing): 182,947
HHS notified
🦬Montana State AGlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Vimly Benefit Solutions, LLC. reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2019-12-19. The breach occurred from 8/16/2019 to 8/19/2019. 4 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 4
🦫Oregon State AGMost recentlinked via multistate filing link · 100%
Vimly Benefit Solutions, Inc. reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2019-12-19. The breach occurred during 1/1/0001. The breach was discovered on 1/1/0001. 46,299 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 12/18/2019.
Affected (this filing): 46,299
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.