Confirmed breach. Intrusion Jun 24, 2020–Jul 1, 2020, discovered Nov 9, 2020 — the first regulatory filing landed 39 days later. 1,340 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksMaine⏱ ME AG >30d · 39dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
1,340
Data types
2
Identity (basic) · Government ID
Jurisdictions
2
ME TN
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jun 24, 2020 → Jul 1, 2020
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
138 days
Breach discovered
Nov 9, 2020
Reported by MAINE AG filing
39 days
🇺🇸TNHHS OCRFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. reported to HHS on 2020-12-18 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 1340 individuals. Breached information located on Email. A business associate employee was victim of an email phishing scheme exposing ePHI including names, addresses, SSNs, and treatment info.
Affected (this filing): 1,340
🦞Maine State AGMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. reported a data breach affecting 3 Maine residents. The breach was discovered on November 9, 2020, and occurred between June 24, 2020, and July 1, 2020. The breach was due to unauthorized access at their vendor, EyeMed. The information acquired includes names and Social Security Numbers. Identity theft protection services are being offered for 2 years through Experian.
Affected (this filing): 3
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.