Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filed Jun 27, 2023. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_7467329e71834072 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
ME WA
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Nov 14, 2022
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Dec 6, 2022
Reported by WASHINGTON AG, MAINE AG filings
Clallam County Public Utility District, a government sector entity reported a phishing incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2022-12-06 and filed notice on 2023-06-27. 1,140 Washington residents were affected. 203 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 22 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 1,140
Clallam County Public Utility District, a government entity, reported a data breach affecting 1,128 individuals. The breach, which occurred on November 14, 2022, was discovered on December 6, 2022. The incident was described as an external system breach (hacking) that exposed individuals' names in combination with their driver's license or non-driver identification card numbers. Affected individuals were notified on June 27, 2023, and offered one year of complimentary credit monitoring services through Experian's IdentityWorks.
Affected (this filing): 1,128
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.