Mity Inc reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-03-06 and was reported on 2025-01-17. 3 Indiana residents were affected. 2,694 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 2,694
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Jan 17, 2025 → Jan 27, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_72b69ff9a10d4ad1 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 95%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Identity (basic) · Government ID
CA IN
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Mar 6, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Mar 6, 2024
Reported by CALIFORNIA AG filing
Mity Inc reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-03-06 and was reported on 2025-01-17. 3 Indiana residents were affected. 2,694 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 2,694
Mity, Inc. notified the California Attorney General of a data security incident where an unauthorized third party gained access to systems on or around March 6, 2024. The incident potentially exposed first name, last name, address, Social Security Number, and Social Insurance Number. The company engaged an incident response team, worked with law enforcement, and contained the access. Affected individuals are offered 12 months of identity monitoring.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.