Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforcedhigh sensitivity
Affected (total reported)
3,658
Data types
4
PHI · Identity (basic) · Government ID
Jurisdictions
3
IN MT WY
Linked filings
3
HHS OCR · State AG
Sensitive data
identity_government
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Jan 16, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
73 days
🏎️Indiana State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Elkhorn Valley Rehabilitation Hospital reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2024-01-16 and was reported on 2024-03-29. 1 Indiana residents were affected. 198 individuals affected in total.
Elkhorn Valley Rehabilitation Hospital reported a data breach to the Montana Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2024-03-29. The breach occurred from 1/16/2024 to 2/4/2024. 22 Montana residents were affected.
Affected (this filing): 22
🇺🇸WYHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Elkhorn Valley Rehabilitation Hospital (WY) reported to HHS on 2024-03-29 a ransomware incident affecting 3,636 individuals. Breached PHI on network server included names, dates of birth, SSNs, driver's license numbers, addresses, claims information, medications, diagnoses, and other treatment information. The CE notified HHS, affected individuals, the media, and posted substitute notice. A business associate was present.
Affected (this filing): 3,636
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.