Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filed Jul 19, 2023. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_700baf16bf53421b · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
CA PA WA
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
May 27, 2023
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
May 31, 2023
Reported by WASHINGTON AG, CALIFORNIA AG filings
Rite Aid Corporation, a health sector entity reported a other incident to the Washington Attorney General. The organization became aware of the incident on 2023-05-31 and filed notice on 2023-07-19. 1,409 Washington residents were affected. 49 days elapsed between awareness and notification. 4 days to identify the breach. 0 days to contain the breach.
Affected (this filing): 1,409
Rite Aid Corporation reported to HHS on 2023-07-19 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 23,433 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server. The cyber-attack compromised PHI including names, dates of birth, addresses, medications, and health insurance information. The entity notified HHS, affected individuals, and the media, installed software patches, and implemented technical safeguards.
Affected (this filing): 23,433
Rite Aid Corporation disclosed a data breach involving a vulnerability in a vendor partner's software exploited by an unknown third party. The incident occurred on May 27, 2023, and was discovered on May 31, 2023. Affected data included limited protected health information (names, DOB, addresses, prescription info) but no SSNs or financial data. Rite Aid installed a patch, notified regulators/law enforcement, and offered one year of identity monitoring via Kroll.
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.