City of Naperville reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-05-28 and was reported on 2025-07-10. 1 Indiana residents were affected. 342 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 342
Clustered 2 filings across 2 jurisdictions · filing window Jul 10, 2025 → Jul 14, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_6db4a9696b0b4e7c · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
IN NH
all State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
May 28, 2025
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
May 28, 2025
Reported by NEW HAMPSHIRE AG filing
City of Naperville reported a data breach to the Indiana Attorney General. The breach occurred on 2025-05-28 and was reported on 2025-07-10. 1 Indiana residents were affected. 342 individuals affected in total.
Affected (this filing): 342
The City of Naperville, IL, notified the NH Attorney General that on May 28, 2025, it discovered liquor and tobacco license application records were publicly viewable via its online portal. The exposed data included names and driver's license numbers for approximately 1 NH resident. No SSNs were involved. The city disabled access, engaged cybersecurity professionals, and began notifying residents on July 10, 2025.
Affected (this filing): 1
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.