Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services, Inc. reported to HHS on 2025-04-24 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 22215 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 22,215
Clustered 3 filings across 3 jurisdictions · filing window Apr 24, 2025 → May 2, 2025. View entity profile → Other incidents for this victim →
incident inc_6b0cc9d09c044353 · merge_method deterministic · confidence 100%
Discovered → first regulatory filing
Range of discovered_at dates across filings
Time between earliest and latest filing
Not recorded for this incident
Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster.
Identity (basic) · Government ID · Health (basic)
ME PA VT
HHS OCR · State AG
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Oct 5, 2024 → Oct 6, 2024
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
Oct 6, 2024
Reported by VERMONT AG filing
Apr 15, 2025
Reported by MAINE AG filing
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services, Inc. reported to HHS on 2025-04-24 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 22215 individuals. Breached information located on Network Server.
Affected (this filing): 22,215
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services, Inc. (DATS) notified consumers of a data breach occurring October 5-6, 2024. An unauthorized actor accessed patient files containing names, DOBs, SSNs, diagnoses, and insurance info. DATS engaged third-party investigators, secured the network, and offered 12 months of credit monitoring and fraud assistance.
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services, Inc. reported a data breach caused by an external system breach (hacking) that occurred on October 5, 2025. The breach was discovered on April 15, 2025. The incident affected 2 Maine residents, who were notified on May 2, 2025. The company offered credit monitoring and identity theft protection services through TransUnion.
Affected (this filing): 2
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.