Confirmed breach. Intrusion Nov 17, 2018–Dec 12, 2018, discovered Mar 4, 2019 — the first regulatory filing landed 53 days later (flagged late). 3,048 individuals reported across the linked filings.
Discovery variance · Leak precedence · Materiality delta · SEC filing delay — no leak-site claim in this cluster; no SEC 8-K in this cluster; needs two dated filings.
Regulatory clocksOregon✗ OR AG >45dHIPAA✓ HHS notifiedFull clock table in Litigation Timeline
HHS OCRState AGConfirmedLifecycle stage 2 of 3: ConfirmedUnverified claimConfirmedEnforced
Affected (total reported)
3,048
Data types
—
Jurisdictions
1
OR
Linked filings
2
HHS OCR · State AG
Timeline
Earliest sighting first · deep chronology in Litigation Timeline
Breach window
Nov 17, 2018 → Dec 12, 2018
When the intrusion reportedly occurred, per the linked filings
107 days
Breach discoveredAG web form
Mar 4, 2019
Reported by OREGON AG filing
53 days
🦫Oregon State AGFirst filinglinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Partners In Care reported a data breach to the Oregon Attorney General. The breach was reported on 2019-04-26. The breach occurred during 11/17/2018 - 12/12/2018. The breach was discovered on 3/4/2019. 3,048 individuals were affected. Notice was sent on 4/26/2019.
Affected (this filing): 3,048
🦫OREGONHHS OCRMost recentlinked via same-victim cross-source · 100%
Partners In Care reported to HHS on 2019-04-26 a Hacking/IT Incident affecting 3048 individuals. Breached information located on Email. An employee was the victim of an email phishing scheme exposing PHI including names, DOB, MRNs, SSNs, diagnoses, lab results, insurance info, and medications. The CE implemented safeguards and retrained staff.
Affected (this filing): 3,048
About this clustering
DisclosureLens links filings into incidents through layered matchers: deterministic rules (same source document, multistate filings of one breach, tight-window same-victim pairs), a weighted-similarity scorer for cross-source candidates, and an operator review queue for everything uncertain. Each link records its own method and confidence — shown per filing in the timeline below. The system defaults to NOT merging when uncertain, because a false merge (collapsing two unrelated breaches) is more harmful than a false split (showing related filings separately); uncertain pairs route to human review instead of auto-merging. Filing summaries shown in the timeline are AI-generated extracts — verify each against its linked source.